The Federal High Court in Abuja, on Monday, adjourned the fundamental rights enforcement suit filed by the alleged terrorist negotiator, Mr Tukur Mamu, against the Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF) to April 23 for adoption of written addresses.
Mamu, in the suit, is challenging his designation as a “terrorist” by the AGF, while standing trial.
The matter, which was scheduled for adoption of written addresses today before Justice Mohammed Umar, could not go on.
The matter was subsequently fixed for April 23 by the court.
Mamu, through his counsel, Johnson Usman, SAN, had, on Nov. 25, 2025, told Justice Umar that the AGF’s action contravened Section 36(5) of the 1999 Constitution which presumes a defendant innocent until proven guilty by the court.
Usman told the court that the printout of publications in the media where his client was designated as a terrorist had been attached to their application as exhibits.
The senior lawyer adopted the processes and urged the court to grant their reliefs by enforcing Mamu’s fundamental rights.
Mamu is the applicant in the fresh suit, marked: FHC/ABJ/CS/713/2024 while the AGF is the only respondent.
Usman said while the Federal Government arraigned the applicant/defendant on alleged terrorism offences, it was wrong for it to go ahead and desinate him as terrorist in the case.
According to him, we have written to AGF to revert the illegal designation of defendant as a terrorist but they refused.
He argued that the counter affidavit filed by the Federal Government against the suit showed an admission of the allegation.
Usman argued that it was legally, morally and religiously wrong to desinate Mamu as a terrorist, having not been convicted by the court where he is facing trial.
“It is the court that has the power to designate him as a terrorist after he must have been convicted and sentenced by court.
“It is only my lord that has the power and duty and not the respondent in this instant case.
“Having done that, the applicant is entitled to damages and to teach them a lesson that you cannot designate a person a terrorist who is undergoing a trial,” he said.
However, AGF’s lawyer, David Kaswe, vehemently opposed Usman’s submission.
He said in opoostion to the application, they filed a five-paragraph counter affidavit.
“We place heavy reliance on all the paragraphs in opposition to the applicant’s application,” he said.
According to Kaswe, the only question before the court is whether at the time of designating the applicant as a terrorist, the AGF has the power to do so.
This, he said, is by law in line with Section 36(1 to 12) and also the provisions of Sections 49 and 50 of Terrorism Prevention and Provision Act, 2022.
He argued that these provisions give the AGF the power to designate anybody a terrorist.
Citing Section 49 of the Act, he said where the Sanction Committee has a reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or attempted to commit, instigated or facilitate an act of terrorism or terrorism financing, or acting on behalf of or at the direction of any person, the committee may recommend to AGF to designate such person as a terrorist.
“So the respondent acted within the provisions of the law,” he said.
Justice Umar then asked Kaswe to address the court on whether it is lawful to designate a defendant who is standing a trial a terrorist when the case has not been concluded.
The AGF’s lawyer insisted that the respondent acted in accordance with the provisions of the law.
“So if at the end of the day, the court did not find him guilty and he is discharged of terrorism offences, what happens to the designation?” the judge asked Kaswe.
Responding, Kaswe argued that under the same Act, the Sanction Committee, which meets quarterly, has the power to review the designation.
“I want my lord to critically look at the Terrorism Prevention Act carefully and juxtaposed it with Section 36 of the constitution,” he said.
He adopted their processes and urged the court to dismiss all the relief sought by Mamu against the AGF, and to hold that the AGF, indeed, has the power In law to designate Manu a terrorist.
But Usman disagreed with Kaswe.
He argued that the reference to Terrorism Prevention Act in Kaswe’s submission was in conflict with Section 36 of the constitution.
The lawyer said while the alleged terrorism charge was filed against Mamu in 2023, the designation was done in 2024.
He said if the designation was done before the charge, it would have been in order, but that after the defendant had been charged, docked and evidence was being taken before the court, the prosecution went ahead to designate him a terrorist.
“By virtue of Section 36(5) of the constitution, he is innocent until proven guilty.
“So their dependence on Section 49 of Terrorism Prevention Act to convict a person who is standing trial is unlawful and should be declared a nullity.
“So their reliance on Section 49 is an injury to them,” Usman argued.
“Counsel, what can you say with the learner silk’s argument that, that Section 49 is in direct conflict with the Section 36 of the constitution and that it should be declared a nullity? .
“This is very simple, this is a person standing trial on terrorism and you want the court to pronounce him as such and before the trial concluded, you designate hin as terrorist, what do you want the court to do again? Justice Umar had asked Kaswe.
Kaswe explained further that the committee constituted under the Act called, a Sanction Committee, is empowered by law to act accordingly.
He said the application to designate Manu as a terrorist had come up before the charge, but Usman interjected, arguing that Kaswe cannot depose to such facts at the bar.
Speaking further, Kaswe argued that Manu by the committee’s recommendation “is a designated terrorist and not a convicted terrorist.”
“If my lord finds the applicant guilty of the offences charged, convicted and sentenced, this time, the applicant will be a convicted terrorist,” Kaswe said.
Justice Umar, therefore, demanded further address, particularly on Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution and Section 49 of Terrorism Prevention Act.
The judge consequently adjourned the matter until Feb. 23, 2026 for adoption of final written addresses of parties in respect to provisions of Section 49 of the Act and Section 36 of the constitution.
